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Class Actions in Hong Kong: 
Yes, No, Maybe
❒
Gary Meggitt*
Although the Civil Justice Reform brought about many changes to the Hong 
Kong courts, multi-party claims are still governed by rules whose origins are over 
a hundred years old. In 2006, the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission (LRC) 
undertook the task of considering whether a scheme for multi-party litigation 
should be adopted in Hong Kong and, if so, to make whatever recommendations 
were needed to bring this into being. The LRC eventually proposed the creation 
of a “class action regime”. This proposal has met with a mixed response from 
the legal profession, industry groups and the wider public. Its fate may soon be 
decided by a cross-sector working group chaired by the Solicitor General.
Introduction
The term “class action” can conjure up a variety of colourful and often 
contradictory images and personalities. On the one hand, there is Erin 
Brockovich, a “hero” who helped obtain a multi-million dollar settlement 
payment from the Pacifi c Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) of California 
for hundreds of victims of groundwater contamination in 1993.1 On the 
other hand, there is Melvyn Weiss, who served over a year in prison 
after pleading guilty to the charge that his fi rm paid secret “kickbacks” 
to plaintiffs.2 Suffi ce to say, such contrasting examples (more-often-than 
not from the US) have engendered far from dispassionate views on class 
actions and those lawyers who specialise in them.
Such views were evident in the response to the Hong Kong Law 
Reform Commission’s (LRC) November 2009 consultation paper on the 
possible introduction of a class action regime in the territory.3 It was 
noted, in the LRC’s May 2012 fi nal report, that the Hong Kong Bar 
* Assistant Professor, Department of Professional Legal Education, University of Hong Kong.
1 Ms Brockovich has her own website, available at http://www.brockovich.com/.
2 See Pettersson, E “Weiss Sentenced to 2 1/2 Years for Kickback Scheme”, (2 June 2008) 
Bloomberg, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aGqfpC
4ZjoAw&refer=home.
3 The consultation paper is available at http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/publications/classactions.
htm.
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Association (HKBA), the Law Society of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong 
Federation of Insurers and Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions gave 
– sometimes qualifi ed – support to such a move whereas the Hong Kong 
Institute of Certifi ed Public Accountants, the Hong Kong Association of 
Banks and the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC) 
did not.4 Indeed, the HKGCC was especially critical, stating in its August 
2012 submission to the Secretary for Justice that “The Chamber is of 
the view that the Report provides no credible case for the introduction 
of a new class action regime in Hong Kong”.5 By contrast, the HKBA 
“supports as a matter of principle any initiative that would allow greater 
access to justice and facilitate the pursuit of legitimate civil claims in 
the courts”.6
As a consequence of this mixed reaction, the LRC’s fi nal report was 
referred by the Department of Justice to a cross-sector working group 
to be chaired by the Solicitor General in November 2012.7 What this 
working group will conclude and when it will do so remain to be seen. 
In the meantime, this paper examines what is meant by “class actions”; 
their current status in Hong Kong; the LRC’s proposals; and the possible 
future regime. Given that the fi nal report is over 300 pages long and 
this article is just over 20 pages in length, this examination will – of 
necessity – focus on the more signifi cant aspects of this controversial 
subject.
What is a ‘Class Action’?
The current discussion over the introduction of a class action regime 
in Hong Kong could be said to have started with the Hong Kong Civil 
Justice Reform (CJR) Working Party’s March 2004 fi nal report,8 which 
recommended that:
“In principle, a scheme for multi-party litigation should be adopted. Schemes 
implemented in comparable jurisdictions should be studied by a working 
group with a view to recommending a suitable model for Hong Kong”
4 See the fi nal report at pages 107–109 for a full list of the supporters and opponents of the 
proposals in the consultation paper. Available at http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/publications/
rclassactions.htm.
5 Available at http://www.chamber.org.hk/FileUpload/201210191737103268/ClassAction.pdf.
6 See the footnote 133 on page 108 of the fi nal report for the HKBA’s full comments.
7 Press release at http://www.news.gov.hk/en/categories/law_order/html/2012/11/20121127_153148.
shtml.
8 Available at http://www.civiljustice.gov.hk/eng/archives_fr_view.html. Not to be confused 
with the LRC’s May 2012 fi nal report. The overall CJR process is addressed in detail in 
G Meggitt, “Civil Justice Reform in Hong Kong – Its Progress and its Future” (2008) 38 
HKLJ 89.
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The LRC subsequently agreed, in September 2006, to look at the matter, 
with the following terms of reference:
“To consider whether a scheme for multi-party litigation should be adopted 
in Hong Kong and, if so, to make suitable recommendations generally”
The 2009 consultation paper and 2012 fi nal report are the fruit of the 
LRC’s work.9
It is worth noting, at this juncture, that the CJR Working Party and 
LRC both refer to “multi-party litigation” rather than “class actions”. 
Whilst there may not appear to be any difference between these 
two terms, it is important to appreciate that “class actions” are only 
one – albeit the most well known – form of “multi-party litigation”. 
The introductory chapter of the LRC’s fi nal report refers to the Law 
Reform Commission of Ireland’s defi nition of “multi-party litigation” 
as follows:
“… instances where a collection or group of users [of courts] shares 
characteristics suffi cient to allow them to be dealt with collectively. The 
central, common feature will vary with the group, but will militate in 
favour of a collective or group approach. This feature may be found in a 
question of law or fact arising from a common, related or shared occurrence 
or transaction. The defi nition of the combining force necessary to 
commence a multi-party procedure is intended to be as fl exible a concept 
as the overriding principles of administrative effi ciency and fairness will 
permit”10
The LRC’s fi nal report also mentions Rachael Mulheron’s defi nition of a 
“class action”:
“A legal procedure which enables the claims (or part of the claims) of a 
number of persons against the same defendant to be determined in the one 
suit. In a class action, one or more persons (‘representative plaintiff’) may sue 
on his or her own behalf and on behalf of a number of other persons (‘the 
class’) who have a claim to a remedy for the same or a similar alleged wrong 
to that alleged by the representative plaintiff, and who have claims that share 
questions of law or fact in common with those of the representative plaintiff 
(‘common issues’). Only the representative plaintiff is a party to the action. 
The class members are not usually identifi ed as individual parties but are merely 
described. The class members are bound by the outcome of the litigation on 
9 A sub-committee under the chairmanship of Mr Anthony Neoh, SC, was appointed in 
November 2006 to consider class action reform and to make proposals to the LRC. The sub-
committee’s membership is listed at pages 1–2 of the fi nal report.
10 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Multi-Party Litigation (2005, Report LRC 76-2005) page 3. 
Cited at page 3 of the LRC’s fi nal report.
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the common issues, whether favourable or adverse to the class, although they 
do not, for the most part, take any active part in that litigation”11
The LRC’s fi nal report does not actually distinguish between the two terms 
and, indeed, uses them interchangeably. Yet there is a distinction between 
“multi-party litigation” and “class actions”, as can be discerned from the 
reference to the fact that “Only the representative plaintiff is a party to the 
action” in Professor Mulheron’s defi nition of the latter. By contrast, group 
litigation under the English Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) is most certainly 
“multi-party litigation” within the defi nition above but differs from class 
actions in that it does not involve a single claim but a number of distinct 
claims which are administered by the court together. The common or related 
issues of fact of law are defi ned within a group litigation order (GLO) as the 
“GLO issues”. The court then establishes a register of claims which raise those 
GLO issues so that these claims may be “managed as a group”. A judgment or 
order in relation to one or more GLO issues is binding on all the parties on 
the register at the time which it is given, unless the court orders otherwise.12
It is not clear if the confl ation or confusion of the two terms was a 
deliberate act on the part of the LRC, although the fact that both the 
consultation paper and fi nal report have the title “Class Actions” suggests 
intent. The HKBA noted this narrowing of focus in its own response to 
the 2009 consultation paper and was critical of any ‘purported limitation’ 
of the LRC’s terms of reference.13 Whatever the truth – intent or error – 
it appears that the LRC had class actions and not some other form of 
multi-party litigation in mind when it made its recommendations in the 
fi nal report. This is unfortunate, given the ire (justifi ed or not) raised in 
some quarters by the term “class action” and the fact that a “class action 
regime” does not represent the only possible way forward for Hong Kong.
The focus (narrowed or not) of the fi nal report is also apparent from 
the fact that it proceeded to identify a number of particular features of 
class actions, being:
Certifi cation – the process of court management starts with the 
authorisation of the class action which is commonly referred to as 
“certifi cation”. Many of the jurisdictions which have adopted class 
action regimes have adopted this certifi cation procedure.
Opt-in or opt-out – under an “opt-out” scheme, potential claimants 
in a class action are bound as members of the class and are subject to 
11 R Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2004) 3. Cited at page 4 of the fi nal report.
12 Group Litigation Orders are governed by CPR Part 19 and Practice Direction 19B. See the CPR 
website at http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part19.
13 HKBA submission available at http://www.hkba.org/whatsnew/submission-position-papers/
2011/20110728.pdf.
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any decisions (ie orders and judgments) in the proceedings unless they 
indicate that they wish to be excluded from both the class action and 
the effects of any judgment. Under the “opt-in” approach, potential 
class members must expressly join the proceedings by taking a prescribed 
step within a stipulated period.
Cut-off date – this is the date from which no potential party can be 
added to the class action. This is intended to prevent an unlimited 
accumulation of parties to the action.
Notifi cation – class action regimes generally provide for the notifi cation 
of the action to potential claimants to enable them to opt-out or 
opt-in. Subsequent notifi cations may be needed in respect of, for 
example, settlement proposals. Class action websites and pages set 
up in court websites have added to “traditional” means of notifying 
potential claimants, by way of the press, in recent years.
Subgroups and lead or representative cases – there may be a need, when 
there are distinct claims on the part of several claimants which may 
differ from those of others, to divide the general group into different 
subgroups. “Lead” or “test” cases may be suitable on other occasions.
Role of the court – it is generally recognised that the rules by which the class 
action is conducted need to be as fl exible as possible to enable the court 
to exercise a high degree of discretion to manage the case effectively.14
It should be borne in mind that, as the fi nal report acknowledged, the 
above features are not without controversy. For example, the “opt-out” 
process is castigated by some as one of the drivers of the much-criticised 
US class action regime.15
Having, to a certain extent, identifi ed what it meant by “class actions” 
the fi nal report sets out the features of, and shortcomings in, the current 
procedure in Hong Kong.
The Current Status of Class Actions in Hong Kong
There is, as one would expect having read this article so far, no “class 
action” regime in the territory at present. Multi-party proceedings in 
Hong Kong are currently governed by RHC O.15, r.12 which provides:
14 See pages 5–9 of the fi nal report.
15 One critic of class actions is the US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (ILR), founded in 
1998 by the United States Chamber of Commerce. Its views on the US “opt-out” approach can 
be seen at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/fi les/images2/stories/documents/
pdf/international/optoutpaper.pdf.
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“Where numerous persons have the same interest in any proceedings … 
the proceedings may be begun, and, unless the Court otherwise orders, 
continued, by or against any one or more of them as representing all or as 
representing all except one or more of them [author’s emphasis]”16
The court may also, upon the application of the plaintiffs, appoint 
a defendant to act as representative of any other defendants in 
the action.17 In addition, any judgment or order given in such 
representative proceedings is binding on all the parties so represented, 
although it may not be enforced without leave.18 It is also possible, 
however, for a defendant to dispute his liability to have a judgment 
or order enforced against him on the ground that “by reason of facts 
and matters particular to his case he should be exempted from such 
liability”.19
RHC O.15 r.12 is based upon the English RSC O.15 r.12, which was 
superseded by the introduction of the CPR in England in 1999. The 
“same interest” requirement that lies at the heart of RHC O.15 r.12 was 
set down by Lord Macnaghten in Duke of Bedford v Ellis:20
“[g]iven a common interest and a common grievance, a representative suit 
was in order if the relief sought was in its nature benefi cial to all whom the 
plaintiff proposed to represent”
In the subsequent English Court of Appeal decision in Markt & Co Ltd v 
Knight Steamship Co Ltd,21 the “same interest” requirement was interpreted 
as a requirement that all class members had to demonstrate identical issues 
of fact and law. Thus, the plaintiff class members would have to show:
 (a) the same contract between all plaintiff class members and the 
defendant(s);
(b) the same defence (if any) pleaded by the defendant against all 
the plaintiff class members; and
 (c) the same relief claimed by the plaintiff class members.
The strict “Edwardian” approach of Duke of Bedford v Ellis and Markt has 
been lessened over the subsequent century by such decisions as those 
in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries,22 where Vinelott J 
held that a “common ingredient” rather than the “same interest” was 
16 RHC O.15 r.12(1). Available at http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/legis/reg/4A/s15.html.
17 RHC O.15 r.12(2)
18 RHC O.15 r.12(3)
19 RHC O.15 r.12(5)
20 [1901] AC 1, 8.
21 [1910] 2 KB 1021 (CA).
22 [1981] Ch.229.
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suffi cient to bring a representative action. Further, in Irish Shipping Ltd 
v Commercial Union Assurance Co Plc (The Irish Rowan)23 where the 
English Court of Appeal held that a claim was validly commenced, as 
the defendant class had the “same interest” in defending the action, 
despite their separate contracts.24 In addition, judicial attempts had 
been made to award damages in representative actions, contrary to the 
principle in Duke of Bedford v Ellis that the “same relief” had to be 
sought, which would rule out any award of damages to class members 
severally.25
Nevertheless, the Hong Kong High Court applied the Markt & Co Ltd 
v Knight Steamship Co Ltd criteria in CBS/Sony Hong Kong Ltd v Television 
Broadcasts Ltd,26 and maintained that the plaintiffs had to establish “a 
common interest, a common grievance and a remedy which is benefi cial 
to all the plaintiffs” but had failed to do so in this particular case. The 
LRC’s fi nal report stressed that there had been few representative actions 
in Hong Kong and added:
“The reason for this lies in part with the fact that the judicial initiatives 
taken have been piecemeal and the landmark cases restricting the rule’s 
application, have never been expressly over-ruled by an Appellate Court 
in Hong Kong”
The fi nal report also endorsed the fi ndings of the CJR Working Party, 
in that RHC O.15 r.12 was “inadequate as a framework for dealing 
with large-scale multi-party situations” and that, in the absence of an 
appropriate procedure for multi-party litigation the courts “have had to 
proceed on an ad hoc basis …  and seeking, so far as possible, agreement 
among parties or potential parties to be bound by the outcome of test 
cases”.27 This approach, in the view of the CJR Working party and the 
authors of the fi nal report, was an inadequate one.
Of course, this analysis of RHC O.15 r.12 is based, in turn, on a view 
that multi-party litigation generally, and class actions specifi cally, are 
benefi cial and should be more readily accommodated within the RHC. 
After a brief summary of the law on representative proceedings and class 
actions in a number of other common law jurisdictions, such as the US 
and England, and in the Mainland the fi nal report set about looking at 
the advantages of a class action regime.
23 [1991] 2 QB 206 (CA).
24 A common leading underwriter clause in each contract of insurance provided that all settlements 
of claims undertaken by the representative defendants would be binding upon all class members.
25 In Prudential a declaration of the class members’ entitlement to damages was sought. They were 
then subsequently able to claim damages individually.
26 [1987] HKLR 306.
27 CJR interim report paras 385–387 at pages 148–149.
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The Benefi ts of a Class Action Regime
The LRC considered the options for “group litigation”28 in “the light of 
the following three overall policy objectives”:
 (a) promoting greater access to justice;
 (b) facilitating fi nal resolution; and
 (c) promoting judicial effi ciency.
These policy objectives were all described as being “refl ected” in the 
underlying objectives set out in the CJR Working Party’s fi nal report, 
and incorporated (in part) into RCH O.1A.29 Yet, it should be recalled 
that the underlying objectives are a very close adaptation of the CPR’s 
overriding objective and were not intended to represent the proverbial 
“fi nal word” on what was just and what was unjust.30 Indeed, the overriding 
objective itself was not, in the words of Deirdre Dwyer, intended to be 
a “super-norm” even though it has had a signifi cant effect on the work 
of the English courts.31 It is, arguably, unwise to justify one’s proposals 
by reference to measures which were intended only to “make more 
systematic the approach to case management presently accepted as a 
matter of common law”32 rather than serve as the basis of a new approach 
to the jurisprudence of civil procedure.
It is also the case that “promoting greater access to justice” and 
“facilitating fi nal resolution” are not actually among the underlying 
objectives in RHC O.1A or those suggested by the CJR fi nal report.33 
Whilst the former of these policy objectives was in the CJR Working 
Party’s terms of reference, RHC O.1A r.1(d) actually states that the 
aim is “to ensure fairness between the parties” and the CJR fi nal report 
suggested that this should be “greater equality between parties”. There 
are, of course, many differences between these aspirations, not least the 
28 Note again the inconsistent language.
29 The CJR fi nal report refers to the following underlying objectives: (i) increasing the cost-
effectiveness of the court’s procedures; (ii) encouraging economies and proportionality in the way 
cases are mounted and tried; (iii) the expeditious disposal of cases; (iv) greater equality between 
parties; (v) facilitating settlement; and (vi) distributing the court’s resources fairly, whereas 
RHC O.1A r.1 states that the underlying objectives are: (a) to increase the cost-effectiveness 
of any practice and procedure to be followed in relation to proceedings before the Court; (b) 
to ensure that a case is dealt with as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable; (c) to promote 
a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings; (d) to 
ensure fairness between the parties; (e) to facilitate the settlement of disputes; and (f) to ensure 
that the resources of the Court are distributed fairly.
30 A fact recognised by the CJR Working Party, among others.
31 D Dwyer, “What is the Meaning of CPR r.1.1(1)?” in The Civil Procedure Rules Ten Years On 
(OUP, Ch.4, 2009).
32 The CJR fi nal report, para.109.
33 Nor is “judicial effi ciency”, although RHC O.1A refers to cases proceeding “effi ciently” and 
“cost-effectiveness” on various occasions.
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fact that “fairness” does not necessarily equate to “equality”. In turn, the 
latter policy objective (of “facilitating fi nal resolution”) appears to be 
an amalgam of RHC O.1A r.1(b) “to ensure that a case is dealt with 
as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable” and (e) “to facilitate the 
settlement of disputes”. Again, these aspirations, whilst not mutually 
exclusive, are not the same as each other or the LRC’s policy objective. 
Nevertheless, having sought to link its proposals to the CJR and post-
2009 RHC, the LRC then sets out the benefi ts and risks of a class action 
regime.
The LRC states that the prime (indeed only) benefi t to plaintiffs of 
a class action regime is “improved access to justice”, which has several 
aspects. It is stated, quite rightly, that “Sophisticated jurisprudence on tort 
or contract” is of little benefi t to ordinary members of the public if a legal 
system lacks “practical and economical ways to enforce deserving claims” 
by those individuals. In addition, the aggregation of claims by a plaintiff 
class could justify the potential costs of such claims. Moreover, there 
is less disparity between a group of plaintiffs facing a defendant public 
body or major corporation than a single plaintiff in the same position. A 
further, intangible, benefi t was the psychological “safety in numbers” felt 
by groups of plaintiffs, especially in respect of the fear of sanctions by, for 
example, defendant employers against plaintiff employees.34
It is suggested in the fi nal report that there would be three benefi ts to 
potential defendants. The fi rst is the avoidance of multiple related lawsuits 
over the same factual or legal issues (by resolving them in just one action) 
with a consequential saving of time, expense and inconvenience. A 
second, related, benefi t is the fact that class actions could “lead to fi nality 
and class-wide resolution of disputes, preferably through settlement” given 
that such outcomes would bind all class members. Finally, a “negotiated 
certifi cation” could provide defendants with “the chance of infl uencing 
the nature of the class, limiting the claims and establishing an expeditious 
and cost-effective way for resolving the claims of the class members”.35 A 
further advantage to both plaintiffs and defendants (and the courts) was 
stated to be “procedural certainty”.36
As with the benefi ts to defendants, the benefi ts to wider society of a 
class action regime were said to be threefold. Firstly, a class action regime 
saves judicial resources from being wasted on repetitive proceedings. The 
34 According to the Victorian Attorney-General’s Law Reform Advisory Council, Report on Class 
Actions in Victoria: Time for a New Approach (1997), para.2.8. Cited at page 65 of the LRC’s fi nal 
report.
35 Alberta Law Reform Institute, Class Actions (2000), Final Report No 85, para.123, quoting the 
views of Jeffrey Goodman of Heenan Blaikie. Cited at page 67 of the fi nal report.
36 Para.3.17 at page 70 of the fi nal report.
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report noted, however, that some research suggested that class actions 
“consume more judicial resources than typical civil cases”.37 Secondly, 
there is an “enhancement of justice” in society, not least by the reduction 
of “areas of dispute and increase[d] … likelihood of reaching a fair and 
equitable ruling”. Finally, it was suggested that a class action regime 
could have a deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers “from committing 
wrongful acts, and prompting them to have a stronger sense of obligation 
to the public”.38 It was pointed out that the US Supreme Court recognised 
the deterrence function of class litigation, whereas the Scottish Law 
Commission and Australian Law Reform Commission held that this 
deterrent effect was only “incidental to the main goal of facilitating access 
to justice”.39
The LRC also acknowledged that there were diffi culties or risks 
associated with a class action regime. Among these was the danger of 
“promoting unnecessary litigation”. This was explained to be the inverse 
of the “safety in numbers” advantage of class actions to plaintiffs; namely, 
undeserving litigants would be prepared to sue as members of a large group 
(where, for example, their exposure to adverse costs orders would be 
ameliorated) in circumstances where they would not be prepared to bring 
a claim on their own. Related to this danger or risk was that of increasing 
the number of claims that lacked any intrinsic merit. Defendants in such 
circumstances may be obliged, as a matter of commercial good sense, 
to settle such claims rather than defend them even though the claims 
themselves were “weak”. A third danger was that posed by so-called 
“entrepreneurial lawyers” (such as Mr Weiss, perhaps) who would use 
the class action regime as “vehicles” to “obtain fees”. Further, there was 
a potential lack of protection for individual class members. Given that 
the large majority of such individuals play little part in the litigation, 
unscrupulous plaintiff lawyers had greater scope “to engage in questionable 
practices, serving their own fi nancial ends rather than the interests of 
class members”.40
The focus of the fi nal report was, again, on class actions rather than 
multi-party litigation or “group litigation”. Insofar as benefi ts of such 
37 Canadian class actions take two or three times as long from fi ling to disposition, and consume 
fi ve times as much judicial time, as ordinary civil cases: TE Willging, LL Hooper and J Niemic, 
Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules (1996), 9. Cited at page 67 of the fi nal report.
38 The Ontario Attorney-General’s Advisory Committee on Class Actions, Report of the Attorney-
General’s Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform (1990), 17; Manitoba Law Reform 
Commission, Class Proceedings (1999), MAN LRC REP 100, 28, 30 and 35; Alberta Law 
Reform Institute, Class Actions (2000), Final Report No 85, para.115and Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, Report on Class Actions (1982), 140–146. Cited at page 68 of the fi nal report.
39 See paras.3.14–3.15 at page 69 of the fi nal report.
40 See pages 70–72 of the LRC’s fi nal report.
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a regime were concerned, the fi nal report relied mainly upon the work 
of the Ontario Law Reform Commission, the Manitoba Law Reform 
Commission, the Alberta Law Reform Institute and that of Professors 
Mulheron and Prichard. There is no reference to any research in Hong 
Kong on these issues. As to that in other jurisdictions, the fi nal report 
conceded that “statistics are incomplete and it has not been possible to 
undertake research by rigorous empirical standards” before asserting that 
“a general picture has emerged” that class actions bring greater access 
to justice and judicial economy. Further, it is suggested that whilst “No 
conclusions can yet be drawn as to whether societal behaviour has 
actually been modifi ed by class actions” the publicity created by some 
actions would “be expected” to have had such an effect.41 In the absence 
of evidence, it is diffi cult to justify such an “expectation”.42
Further, whilst there is much merit in looking at examples of good 
practice in other jurisdictions when deciding how to proceed at home, 
it is, as Lord Neuberger MR pointed out in his Upjohn Lecture in 
November 2012 “unwise for us to adopt a system which has developed 
in a legal, social, and political culture which, whilst similar to ours in 
some ways, is profoundly different in others”.43 Whilst his Lordship may 
have been discussing legal education and training, the point is equally 
valid when applied to other reforms. It should not be forgotten that class 
action regimes were fi rst developed to address perceived defi ciencies in 
the US judicial system rather than those in Hong Kong (or England, 
upon which Hong Kong’s is based). Yet, in response to the contention by 
some respondents to the consultation paper that “there was no pressing 
demand for a class action regime” in Hong Kong, the LRC simply retorted 
that the types of cases that were identifi ed by the LRC as suitable for class 
action proceedings44 would be better dealt with by way of class actions. 
This, with respect, seems to be both a circular argument and fails to 
answer the question posed by the respondents.
The fi nal report also contained a short passage addressing the 
differences between the Hong Kong and the US legal systems, such as 
contingency fees, juries in civil cases and punitive damages in the US, 
in an attempt to defl ect some of the concerns raised about introducing 
41 See para.3.69 at page 93 of the fi nal report.
42 The HKBA suggested that a broader assessment of the “wider economic, social and legal 
contexts” may be required before deciding whether a class action regime was required in Hong 
Kong. The LRC countered with the UK MoJ’s observation that a “meaningful global impact 
assessment would be virtually impossible to achieve”. There are, however, other forms of 
empirical research – such as surveys of litigants and lawyers – that could, but were not, have 
been carried out by the LRC.
43 Available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/lord-neuberger-121115-speech.pdf
44 Listed in Appendix 1 of the fi nal report.
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class actions to Hong Kong.45 It is, however, not only the case that the 
differences in the two jurisdictions that could make a class action regime 
less contentious in Hong Kong than in the US, they could make it more 
problematical to introduce a workable class action regime in the territory. 
For example, the absence of contingency fees in Hong Kong may prevent 
the rise of “entrepreneurial lawyers” but it also creates the funding 
diffi culty identifi ed in the report (and discussed further below).
It was noted in the fi nal report that 35 of the respondents to the 
consultation paper were in favour of a class action regime, whilst 18 were 
against it or expressed reservations.46 Those expressing opposition or 
reservations raised a number of the issues addressed above (and others) 
and took the view was that “the risks in having a class action regime 
outweighed the benefi ts”. The LRC was “not persuaded that these concerns 
tip the balance against reform” although, in light of the same, they decided 
that it would be sensible to “phase in the implementation of a class action 
regime by starting with consumer cases”. Such an incremental approach 
would, it was suggested, also be sensible in the absence of “proper funding 
for representative plaintiffs of limited means”.47
The Proposed Class Action Regime
Having concluded that a class action regime would be the right way 
forward for Hong Kong, the LRC proceeded to outline the features of 
such a regime.
Certifi cation
The LRC stressed that a certifi cation stage was an “essential element” of 
any proposed class actions regime, with the process to take place – ideally 
– as early as possible in the case.48 The fi nal report did not, however, make 
any specifi c recommendations as to the nature of certifi cation, other than 
that there should be such a process to “fi lter out unsuitable cases”. A set 
of fi ve certifi cation criteria identifi ed by the UK Civil Justice Council49 
were, however, broadly endorsed by the LRC, these being:
 (a) a minimum number of identifi able claimants (the “numerosity” 
criterion);
45 Pages 72–74 of the fi nal report.
46 Listed in the two tables at pages 107–109 of the report.
47 Para.3.74 at page 96 of the fi nal report.
48 Recommendations 2(2) and 9(4) of the fi nal report.
49 See page 263 of the fi nal report.
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 (b) the claim discloses a genuine cause of action and has legal merit 
(the “merits” criterion);
 (c) there is suffi cient commonality of interest and remedy among 
the proposed class members (the “commonality” criterion);
 (d) a class action is the most appropriate (or a superior) “legal 
vehicle” to resolve the dispute (the “superiority” criterion); and
 (e) a representative party (or representative plaintiff) will take the 
action forward on behalf of all the class members. In particular 
he should be able to represent the interests of the class both 
properly and adequately (the “representative” criterion).
Most of the respondents to the consultation paper agreed in principle 
with the introduction of some form of certifi cation process for class 
actions, although some had their own views on the details of the same. 
For example, in respect of the “commonality” criterion, the Law Society 
suggested that the question to be answered should be:
“Whether if each member of the class is to commence a separate action 
instead of a single class action,
(a)  some common question of law or fact would arise in such separate 
actions; and
(b)  the rights to relief claimed in such separate actions are in respect 
of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions or 
transactions with substantially the same subject matter”
In the circumstances, it is understandable that the LRC decided to leave 
the details to be determined by others later.
Under the general subject of “case management” it was also felt by the 
LRC that active case management would be necessary; the CFI should 
have exclusive jurisdiction of the class action regime for the fi rst fi ve years 
“until a body of case law” had been established; and that ADR techniques 
such as mediation and arbitration should be “fully utilised”.50
Consumer Claims Only
Recommendation 1 of the fi nal report was as follows:
“We believe that there is a good case for the introduction of a comprehensive 
regime for multi-party litigation so as to enable effi cient, well-defi ned and 
workable access to justice. In the light of opposition and reservations 
50 See G Meggitt, “Mediation in Hong Kong – A Work in Progress” (2012) 6.2 Journal of 
Comparative Law 220 for a discussion of the development of mediation in the territory, and the 
changing attitudes of the judiciary and Hong Kong government towards it, over the past decade.
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expressed in the consultation exercise, an incremental approach to 
implementing a class action regime merits consideration. For this purpose, 
a class action regime may start with consumer cases, and in the light of 
experience gained, the regime may be extended to other cases”51
What is meant by “consumer cases”? The approach favoured by the 
LRC was to follow s.4 of the Consumer Council Ordinance (Cap.216) 
so that the class action regime would cover “claims made by consumers 
in relation to goods, services and immovable property”.52 In addition, 
both contractual and tortious claims could be brought under the class 
action regime. The authors of the fi nal report also suggested adapting 
the defi nition of a “consumer” from s.3 of the Unconscionable Contracts 
Ordinance (Cap.458) for the purposes of the class action regime.53
This is a peculiar concession to the critics of class actions. Firstly, the 
fi nal report identifi ed a wide-range of types of cases that could be suitable 
for class action proceedings, including labour disputes and environmental 
cases. Yet, it was decided that these categories should be put on the 
proverbial “shelf” for the time being with no justifi cation other than 
the “reservations” which had been raised in the consultation exercise – 
reservations which were in respect of a class action regime overall and the 
LRC had taken time to largely dismiss. This incremental approach sits 
oddly with the suggestion that the “mechanism” for a “full” class action 
regime should be “in place from the outset”.54
Secondly, it seems odd that the LRC should recommend an “incremental 
approach” by way of starting with consumer cases which the fi nal report itself 
states “constitute a large segment (or probably the majority) of cases suited 
to class actions”.55 If one accepts the fi nal report’s description of consumer 
cases as the plurality or majority of potential class actions – although no 
51 All the recommendations are summarised at pages 270–274 of the fi nal report.
52 Section 4 sets out the Consumer Council’s functions thus “(1) The functions of the Council 
are to protect and promote the interests of consumers of goods and services and purchasers, 
mortgagors and lessees of immovable property by: (a) collecting, receiving and disseminating 
information concerning goods, services and immovable property; (b) receiving and examining 
complaints by and giving advice to consumers of goods and services and purchasers, mortgagors 
and lessees of immovable property; (c) taking such action as it thinks justifi ed by information 
in its possession, including tendering advice to the Government or to any public offi cer; (d) 
encouraging business and professional associations to establish codes of practice to regulate the 
activities of their members; (e) undertaking such other functions as the Council may adopt with 
the prior approval of the Chief Executive in Council”.
53 (1) A person (A) is a consumer in relation to a dealing with another person (B) if – (a) the 
dealing results in A – (i) receiving or having the right to receive goods or services; or (ii) 
acquiring or having the right to acquire immovable property as purchaser, mortgagor, chargor 
or lessee; and (b) A is not acting, or purporting to act, in the course of a business but B is so 
acting or purporting to so act. (2) It is for the person claiming that a person is not a consumer 
in relation to a dealing to prove that fact.
54 Para.9.1 at page 243.
55 Para.3.74 at page 96.
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evidence was presented in the fi nal report to support this point – there is 
an inherent contradiction in “limiting” the proposed regime to such cases. 
Even if one does not accept the fi nal report’s description, the defi nition 
of both “consumer cases” and “consumer” is wide enough to suggest that 
a very large number of claims could be permitted under the new regime, 
defeating the “incremental approach”.
Thirdly, another justifi cation which is given for this incremental 
approach is the need to avoid the encouragement of “unmeritorious 
litigation” and the importance of procedures “to ensure fairness, 
expedition and cost effectiveness”. Yet, surely such safeguards are the 
sine qua non of any civil justice system. It surely cannot be that the LRC 
was suggesting that such safeguards are absent in the RHC as it currently 
stands. Whilst there may be particular aspects of a class action, such as 
the need to ensure that the interests of class members are safeguarded vis-
à-vis the representative plaintiff and vice versa, the inherent legal and 
factual merits of a claim do not depend upon how many plaintiffs there 
may be.
Perhaps the real reason for the concession lies in the recognition that 
there is a lack of “proper funding for representative plaintiffs of limited 
means”. The recommendation for an incremental introduction of the 
regime, starting with consumer actions, is posited on the basis that such 
claims could be funded by the use of the Consumer Council’s Consumer 
Legal Action Fund. The LRC repeated the call (fi rst made in the 2009 
consultation paper) that the scope of the Fund should be expanded “with 
the injection of new funds to fi nance suitable consumer class actions”. 
Such new funds would clearly be necessary given that the chief executive 
of the Consumer Council stated in September 2012 that the fund had 
HK$18 million, which would arguably be insuffi cient to maintain even 
one or two sustained class actions over the typical lifetime of such 
litigation.56 This issue is returned to below.
Whilst the fi nal report recommends that the class action regime 
should cover only consumer cases in the immediate term, it added that 
the regime should eventually apply to public law cases (ie claims relating 
to the procedural lawfulness of an administrative decision that affects a 
class of plaintiffs).57 That said, the LRC did not suggest any changes to 
56 A Wan, “Proposal by Law Reform Commission a Step Towards Class-Action Cases” 
(18 September 2012) South China Morning Post.
57 Recommendation 4 reads: “We recommend that: (1) the new class actions regime should apply 
to public law cases, in addition to the current section 21K(1) of the High Court Ordinance 
(Cap.4) and Order 53 of the Rules of the High Court; and (2) an opt-out approach should be 
the default position unless the court orders otherwise in the interests of justice and the proper 
administration of justice”.
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s.21K(1) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap.4) and RHC O.53 which 
govern public law cases. This is not to say that the current state of public 
law – or public interest – litigation in the territory is without its critics.58
Opting Out
As has already been noted, the fi nal report made extensive references to 
the work of Professor Mulheron. This is especially the case in respect of 
the choice between an “opt-out” and “opt-in” class action regime. For 
example, it listed the competing arguments in respect of the “opt-out” 
approach identifi ed by Mulheron including the assertion (in favour) 
that an opt-out regime enhances access to legal remedies for socially, 
intellectually or psychologically disadvantaged people who would be 
unable actively to include themselves in the proceedings, whilst (against) 
there is the assertion that it is wrong that someone can pursue an action 
on behalf of others without their express mandate.59 That said, it was 
clear which approach the authors favoured. In particular, in answer to 
the preceding argument (and similar ones) against the opt-out approach, 
the LRC stated that, with appropriate procedural safeguards, an opt-out 
system would comply with the “requirements of access to justice and 
protection of property rights” prescribed by arts.6 and 35 of the Basic Law.
In addition, there was an absence of any substantive exploration of 
the case for an “opt-in” system. By contrast, the fi nal report cited the 
research of the Australian Law Reform Commission, the UK Civil Justice 
Council and the Law Reform Commission of Ireland in support of an 
opt-out regime. The LRC’s conclusion was that an “opt-out” system was 
preferable because it promoted greater participation on the part of class 
members; it avoided the logistical diffi culties of identifying and naming 
all class members; and because such a system “achieves the closure of 
issues”. The LRC gave itself some “wriggle room”, however, by adding that 
the courts should have the discretion “to depart from the opt-out regime 
where there are strong reasons for doing so”. Another qualifi cation to this 
general approach was that plaintiffs from outside Hong Kong would be 
required to opt-in to a class action in order to benefi t from any outcome 
of the proceedings.60
58 See K Kong, “Public Interest Litigation in Hong Kong: A New Hope for Social Transformation?” 
(2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 327–343.
59 Annex 3 of the fi nal report contains a detailed review of the human rights and Basic Law issues 
relevant to the “opt-out” approach.
60 Recommendation 3 reads: “We recommend that, subject to discretionary powers vested in the 
court to order otherwise in the interests of justice and the proper administration of justice, 
the new class action regime should adopt an opt-out approach. In other words, once the court 
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Interestingly, a majority of the respondents to the consultation paper 
(which contained the same discussion of the two alternatives) favoured 
the “opt-in” approach. Of particular note is the fact that the Consumer 
Council took the view that an opt-out procedure “might not be suitable 
in some circumstances” given that each case “turned on its own merits” 
and that, consequently, the courts should have the discretion to decide 
on the appropriate approach in each individual case. Nevertheless, 
despite the division of opinion among consultees, the LRC abided by the 
suggestion in the consultation paper that an opt-out system be adopted. 
The HKGCC took issue with this decision after the publication of the 
fi nal report, stating:
“But if a claimant cannot be located or will not come forward at the outset 
of an action, why should they be any more likely to come forward or be 
found later when an award/settlement has been made? The answer implicit 
in the Report is: because they were not interested when there was no 
money on the table, but only legal bills and the risk of adverse costs; yet 
when victory is won, they suddenly want to share in the spoils”61
This is, perhaps, a somewhat intemperate interpretation of the motives 
of potential class action plaintiffs but it, nevertheless, contains a grain of 
truth. It is truth recognised by Mulheron and other advocates of the class 
action regime when they speak of the reluctance of individual plaintiffs 
to bring claims in their own names compared to their willingness to join 
a class of plaintiffs.
Choice of Plaintiff
The LRC consultation paper identifi ed what was described as a risk in 
class actions in that a successful defendant may not be able to recover its 
legal costs from an impecunious plaintiff acting as the class representative. 
This is exacerbated by the fact that, in many jurisdictions, class members 
other than the representative plaintiff enjoy immunity from costs orders. 
Given that a defendant’s costs could be considerable, this leads to 
a related danger of them being “blackmailed” into settlements rather 
than losing money in seeking what would be a pyrrhic victory. The LRC 
suggested that procedural safeguards should be put in place to prevent 
such abuses.
certifi es a case suitable for a class action, the members of the class, as defi ned in the order of 
court, would be automatically considered to be bound by the litigation, unless within the time 
limits and in the manner prescribed by the court order a member opts out”.
61 See the HKGCC’s August submission to the Secretary for Justice.
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The LRC identifi ed four such safeguards. Firstly, the choice by the class 
members of an impecunious representative plaintiff could be construed as 
vexatious and abusive conduct. Secondly, the fi nancial adequacy of the 
representative plaintiff could be one of the criteria which would need 
to be satisfi ed during the certifi cation process. Similarly, there could be 
“an explicit provision” that the representative plaintiff proves that there 
were “suitable funding and costs-protection arrangements” for the claim. 
Finally, the courts could be given the power to order security for costs to 
deter class members from selecting impecunious representative plaintiffs.
The LRC concluded, quite rightly, that the rules designed to address 
vexatious and abusive conduct would not be a satisfactory safeguard 
as “they are not aimed at tackling the problem of impecunious class 
representatives”. Instead, the LRC recommended a combination of 
measures comprising the requirement that a representative plaintiff prove 
to the court’s satisfaction that there were suitable funding and costs-
protection arrangements at the certifi cation stage and the availability of 
security for costs orders against representative plaintiffs.62 The majority 
of the respondents to the consultation paper, which also laid out the four 
alternatives, supported the eventual recommendations for adequacy of 
representation at certifi cation and security for costs. A minority, however, 
were concerned that the provision for security for costs could stifl e 
meritorious claims.
There are, of course, a number of questions begged by this discussion of 
impecunious plaintiffs. Among them are what is meant by “impecunious” 
and what if all the class members are impecunious? A simple answer to 
the former question is that “impecunious” means someone who would be 
unable to pay the costs of the defendant if ordered to do so, as per one 
of the grounds for ordering security for costs (albeit this ground applies 
to nominal plaintiffs and limited companies only).63 The LRC, however, 
also refers to “truly impecunious plaintiffs” who should be able to receive 
“discretionary funding” in order for them to “obtain legal remedies”. 
No further explanation of a “truly impecunious” plaintiff, nor how this 
measure would operate in practice, was given. Would this funding come 
from the Legal Aid Department? If so, what criteria would need to be 
satisfi ed by the representative plaintiff to obtain the necessary funds? 
Would these criteria be the same as those for ordinary plaintiffs bringing 
individual claims and, if not, how and why would they differ?
In the absence of funding from some outside source, the class members 
would have to fi nd a representative plaintiff with suffi cient fi nancial 
62 This was Recommendation 5 of the fi nal report.
63 See RHC O.23 r.1(1). Available at http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/legis/reg/4A/s23.html
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resources to be able to meet the certifi cation requirements (and pay a sum 
into court as security for costs if such an order were made). Clearly, few 
class members would be willing or able to meet such a requirement. If this 
was the case, and all the class members were therefore “impecunious”, 
what hope would there be of them bringing a claim in the fi rst instance, 
let alone any one of them satisfying the requirement for adequacy of 
representation at certifi cation or complying with a security for costs order? 
Once again, an irresistible force – the desire for a class action regime – 
meets an immoveable object – money … or the lack thereof.
RHC O.15 r.12
The consultation paper recommended that RHC O.15 r.12 would need to 
be replaced by a new set of procedures to cater for the class action regime. 
Given that the fi nal report had pulled back from a wholescale change to 
the RHC in favour of an incremental approach, this raised the question of 
what should happen to the existing procedure for representative actions. 
The LRC came to the conclusion that RHC O.15 r.12 should be retained 
“at least until the proposed [class action] regime is extended to all cases” 
and its retention thereafter to be “reviewed at that time”.
It is unsurprising that the LRC decided against any changes to the 
existing regime for dealing with representative actions, given that it agreed 
with Professor Mulheron that “a comprehensive regime for class action 
litigation is more desirable” than even a “more liberal” implementation 
of RHC O.15 r.12. Presumably this means that, until the class action 
regime is extended beyond consumer cases, multi-party litigation in many 
circumstances will continue to be constrained by the existing procedural 
rules. If so, the LRC’s three stated policy objectives will remain unsatisfi ed.
Funding a Class Action Regime
The LRC’s consultation paper correctly stated that little could be achieved 
by the introduction of a class action regime if there were no adequate 
means to support those plaintiffs who lacked the fi nancial resources to 
bring and maintain claims. It was also recognised by the LRC that class 
actions were signifi cantly more expensive than simple one-plaintiff-
verses-one-defendant proceedings.64 These facts, when combined with 
the general rule under the RHC that – in the words of the report – “costs 
64 The LRC’s fi nal report referred to the empirical research carried out within Deborah R Hensler 
et al., “Class Action Dilemmas – Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain” (Executive Summary; 
RAND Institute for Civil Justice; Santa Monica; 1999), 22.
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follow success”65 constituted what the LRC considered to be “a major 
obstacle to commencing a class action”. It appears that the majority of 
the respondents to the consultation paper also acknowledged these linked 
diffi culties.
The Costs Regime
The LRC noted that the fi rst diffi culty, that of the costs regime, had been 
dealt with in two ways in other jurisdictions with class action regimes. 
For example, in the US there is a “No costs order rule”, by which the 
successful litigant is not ordinarily entitled to recover its legal costs from 
the loser. British Columbia had adopted a variation of this rule in that 
successful parties are not entitled to their costs, unless there has been, 
for example, “vexatious, frivolous or abusive conduct on the part of any 
party” or “there are exceptional circumstances that make it unjust to 
deprive the successful party of costs”.
The second method of mitigating the usual costs rule was described 
in the fi nal report as the “Costs follow the event rule” under which the 
successful party is prima facie entitled to its costs. The explanation given 
for this approach, at least insofar as Ontario is concerned, is that the court 
is directed to consider whether the class action was a test case, raised a 
novel point of law, or involved a matter of public interest when it exercises 
its discretion as to costs.66 Given that the Hong Kong courts have a 
discretion as to costs under RHC O.62 and that the general approach is 
for costs to “follow the event” and not “costs follow success”, the LRC’s 
choice of language is potentially confusing. That said, it appears that the 
LRC was suggesting that the scope of the discretion to make costs orders 
outside the usual approach may be greater in class actions than in other 
claims.
The fi nal report also identifi ed several “costs-shifting” measures in 
other jurisdictions by which the courts attempt to relieve some or part of 
the costs burden from the representative plaintiff and place it upon (one 
or more of) the defendant, class members, class lawyers or to a third party. 
For example, s.31(1) of the Ontario Class Proceedings Act – which is also 
referred to as a “costs follow the event” regime – is cited as an example 
65 The RHC does not actually use this language. RHC O.62, r.3(2) provides that: “[i]f the Court 
in the exercise of its discretion sees fi t to make any order as to the costs of or incidental to any 
proceedings, the Court shall, subject to this Order, order the costs to follow the event, except 
when it appears to the Court that in the circumstances of the case some other order should be 
made as to the whole or any part of the costs”. Thus the unsuccessful party pays the successful 
party’s costs. Available at http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/legis/reg/4A/s62.html
66 See para.8.5 at page 188 of the LRC’s fi nal report.
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of a costs-shifting regime. The LRC took the view that the “exceptional 
circumstances” in which the costs burden could be transferred to the 
successful defendant rendered this approach inadequate for addressing the 
problem “of funding class actions” and it did not recommend its adoption 
in Hong Kong.67
Another approach is to shift the costs from the representative plaintiff 
to the other class members, as under s.33ZJ(2) of the Australian FCA 
Act or the US “common fund” doctrine. The fi nal report noted, however, 
a number of limitations with the Australian approach and, more widely, 
the reluctance of class members (other than the representative plaintiff) 
to contribute voluntarily to the expenses of the class action (NB in the 
absence of any sanction). In light of these problems, the LRC did not see 
this as a solution to the lack of funding for class actions in the territory.68
The third costs-shifting mechanism is to shift the costs of the litigation 
to the class lawyers by way of “conditional fees” or “contingency fees”. The 
former, which are permitted in England and Wales, involve the payment 
of the legal fees by client on the traditional (eg hourly rate) basis plus an 
additional “success fee” if the claim is successful. If the action is lost, the 
client pays no legal fees.69 “Contingency fees”, as in the US, are based on 
the amount of compensation recovered from the action. If the claim is 
unsuccessful, no legal fees are charged, whereas if it is won, a percentage 
of the compensation recovered will be paid as legal fees to the lawyers. 
Following a further explanation of both types of mechanism, including the 
Scottish Law Commission’s views on the advantages and disadvantages of 
contingency fee arrangements,70 the fi nal report observed:
“Arguably, the most important benefi t is that of increasing access to justice 
by removing or reducing some of the costs disincentives that currently 
deter the initiation of class actions. This is achieved by transferring some of 
the risk, and part of the cost, of litigation from the clients to their lawyers, 
who are better able to assess the risks involved and to bear those risks by 
spreading them over a large number of law suits”
67 Para.8.19 at page 192 of the fi nal report.
68 Para.8.24 at page 194 of the fi nal report.
69 The client will still, however, be liable to pay any associated disbursements, such as an expert 
witness’ expenses. There are also so-called “shared risk” conditional fee agreements by which, in 
the event of losing the claim, the client pays a reduced fee to the lawyer.
70 Para.8.34 at page 197 of the fi nal report. The passage is repeated here as it contains a helpful 
summary of the issues: “The perceived advantages of contingency fees include the following: 
(a) Poor clients who are unable to pay lawyers’ fees can bring their cases to court. (b) Lawyers 
accepting cases on this basis will have a stake in winning the case and, therefore, will be more 
committed and more diligent in their preparation and presentation. (c) Lawyers may benefi t by 
a simplifi cation of the administrative procedures by which they are paid and by an increase in 
their earnings. On the other hand, the following are the perceived disadvantages of contingency 
fees: (a) It is said, on the basis of experience in America, that a contingency fee system leads to 
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Conversely:
“The contingent nature of the lawyer’s remuneration creates a strong 
fi nancial incentive for the lawyer to accept a small settlement in order to 
ensure some fees, rather than risk losing at trial and recovering nothing”
The latter diffi culty could be, and is, dealt with by a requirement that 
settlements (including the costs/fees) are to be approved by the court 
presiding over the claim. This, however, required a pro-active approach 
on the part of the courts to ensure that class members were adequately 
protected.71
The fi nal report referred to the previous LRC report on conditional 
fees published in July 2007 and repeated its observations that, fi rstly, ATE 
insurance was “an integral component of a conditional fees regime” and, 
secondly, that “it was doubtful that ATE insurance would be available at an 
affordable premium and on a long-term basis in Hong Kong”. Consequently, 
other than the recommendation that representative plaintiffs should be 
ordered to pay security for costs in appropriate circumstances, the LRC 
made no suggestions on altering the current costs rules under the RHC. 
The 2009 consultation paper had stated that conditional fee agreements 
warranted further study but, as the majority of responses were against this 
possibility the LRC withdrew this “observation”.
Funding
In the absence of any possible change in the costs rules, the fi nal report 
turned to the possible methods of funding class actions under the existing 
“costs follow the event” rules.
The consultation paper had proposed extending the ordinary legal aid 
and supplementary legal aid schemes to class actions. It was, however, 
indicated in the fi nal report that the Director of Legal Aid (“DLA”) had 
“made it clear that the current statutory framework only allowed the 
granting of legal aid on an individual basis”. Further, if an action was 
excessive awards and an explosion in litigation. (b) They create a confl ict of interest between 
the lawyer and the client to avoid the heavy expense of preparing for a trial (proof) the lawyer 
may encourage settlement when that is not in the client’s best interests. (c) Fees are excessive 
since lawyers can charge an unreasonable percentage (in the absence of arrangements to control 
excessive fees). (d) Lawyers are encouraged to use unethical tactics in the way they conduct 
cases. (e) The rule that expenses follow success reduces the attractiveness of contingent fees 
to litigants in the United Kingdom since if they lose they will still have to pay the other side’s 
costs. (f) They seem to offer little to those legally aided litigants who have no contribution to 
pay (unless there is a strong risk of the statutory claw back taking most of the award). (g) They 
are only applicable where a fi nancial claim is being made and not, for example, in actions of 
[injunction or declaration] or in applications for judicial review”.
71 Paras.8.35–8.36 at page 198 of the fi nal report.
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jointly commenced by legally-aided and non-legally aided plaintiffs, the 
DLA would pay only those costs attributable to the legally-aided plaintiffs. 
If the action failed, the DLA would be liable for the costs incurred by 
the legally-aided person but not the “additional costs otherwise incurred 
by the class action proceedings” nor the costs incurred by other class 
members. The DLA had also stressed that the underlying policy of legal 
aid was to help those who could not afford to get access to justice and that 
affl uent class members would not receive a “free ride” from a legally-aided 
representative plaintiff.
Although a majority of the respondents did support the extension of 
the legal aid schemes to class actions the LRC concluded that a class 
action regime might be constrained if it operated “within the strait-jacket 
of the legal aid schemes” and withdrew the recommendation. Similarly, a 
“Conditional Legal Aid Fund” (CLAF) which would combine conditional 
fees and legal aid, also fell by the wayside in light of the lack of support by 
the DLA and the anticipated lack of fi nance from either the government 
or the legal profession.
Another suggestion in the consultation paper was for a “class action 
fund” (CAF), which would be supported by public monies and could be 
administered by the DLA. It was suggested that the CAF would operate 
in the following way:
 (a) a representative plaintiff would apply for funding to the CAF;
 (b) the CAF may be responsible for the representative plaintiff ’s 
disbursements, legal fees incurred or an adverse costs order if 
the defendant wins (or a combination thereof);
 (c) to enable the CAF to be self-fi nancing, representative plaintiffs 
may be required to reimburse the CAF for the sum it paid out and 
there may be a levy on the court award or the settlement sum;
 (d) the CAF would not fund individual class members who may 
bring individual proceedings after the determination of the 
common issues in their favour.
The LRC held that “the CAF concept offers a useful means of funding 
a modern class action regime”. The majority of the respondents to the 
consultation paper also supported the recommendation on establishing 
a CAF. Having said that, the LRC recognised that establishing a fully-
funded CAF would be problematical. Accordingly, and in light of the 
suggested incremental approach to the implementation of the class action 
regime, it was suggested that the Consumer Legal Action Fund would be 
able to fund class actions in the interim.
Finally, the consultation paper had raised the possibility of permitting 
litigation funding companies (“LFCs”) to provide fi nance for class actions, 
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albeit conceding that this was a controversial suggestion. In the event, 
the majority of the respondents to the consultation paper were opposed 
to LFCs operating in Hong Kong, and the LRC therefore dropped the 
suggestion “as the community at large does not accept the idea of funding 
litigation for profi t”.72 The HKBA was, for example, wary of LFCs and saw 
little difference between them and “recovery agents”, who have attracted 
the ire of not only the HKBA but the Law Society.73 Consequently, 
Recommendation 8 of the fi nal report was:
 “(1) We conclude, as generally accepted, that if a suitable funding 
model for plaintiffs of limited means could not be found, little 
could be achieved by a class action regime.
 (2) In the long term we recommend establishing a general class 
actions fund, that is a special public fund which can make 
discretionary grants to all eligible impecunious class action 
plaintiffs providing fi nancial support for them to obtain legal 
remedies and which in return the representative plaintiffs must 
reimburse from proceeds recovered from the defendants.
 (3) Given the complexity and the diffi culties of introducing a 
comprehensive funding mechanism in Hong Kong and our 
recommendation that the proposed class action regime should 
be implemented incrementally, starting with consumer cases, 
we recommend increasing the Consumer Legal Action Fund’s 
resources to make funding available for class action proceedings 
arising from consumer claims. If the scope of the Fund were to be 
expanded to cover class actions, it would be important to devise 
mechanisms to ensure that class members who are not assisted by 
the Fund should share equitably in the costs of the proceedings”
The Problem of Money
As will have been appreciated by now, the fundamental problem faced 
by the LRC is that it was not merely seeking to address a procedural 
obstacle faced by potential plaintiffs, but a fi nancial one. Simply put, 
those individuals who are unable to bring an individual claim because 
they lack fi nancial resources are unlikely to be able to bring a “collective” 
or “group” claim for the same reason.
The US deals with this problem by way of contingency fees, whereby 
the compensation recovered by the plaintiffs becomes the source of 
72 Para.8.152 at page 241 of the fi nal report.
73 See the Law Society circular 05-261 (SG) of 17 May 2005.
9Class Actions in Hong Kong.indd   240 6/22/2013   6:18:13 PM
Vol 43 Part 1 Class Actions in Hong Kong: Yes, No, Maybe 241
the fi nance for the litigation and the lawyers, for all practical purposes, 
provide “free credit” to their clients up to the time that compensation is 
available. In England, conditional fee agreements play a similar role – 
although the lawyers fees are not derived from the compensation – and 
ATE insurance is the “hedge” against the risk that unsuccessful plaintiffs 
may have to pay the defendant’s legal costs.74 The essence of both systems 
is the risk transfer from the client to their lawyers.
In Hong Kong, a solicitor may not enter into a conditional or 
contingency fee arrangement in respect of litigation work.75 Barristers are 
similarly prohibited from engaging in work on a contingency fee basis. 
The prohibition has its origins in the torts of “maintenance”, which is 
the giving of assistance, encouragement or support to litigation by a third 
party who has no legitimate interest in the litigation and “champerty”, 
in which the third part supports the litigation in consideration of a 
promise by the actual litigant to give him or her a share in the proceeds 
of the claim.76 It is, of course, permissible for solicitors to take on non-
contentious work on a contingency fee basis and even waive their fees in 
the event that a transaction is not completed. Such practices, it seems, 
are not considered to be unduly “entrepreneurial”.
Unfortunately, as the LRC observed in both its fi nal report on class 
actions and its earlier work on conditional fees, there was little support 
for conditional fee arrangements in Hong Kong – there was “the least 
amount of support” from professional bodies; very little support from 
the insurance industry; and only minority support among law fi rms and 
barristers’ chambers. The arguments against conditional fee arrangements 
included the old familiar “chestnuts” of the risk of confl icts of interest 
between clients and lawyers and the increase of frivolous claims.77 It seems 
odd, in particular, that contingency fees for non-contentious business do 
not raise the spectre of confl icts of interest whereas those for litigation 
do. No matter how weak such arguments are, however, they are held by 
those who would operate – or regulate – conditional fee arrangements 
and, consequently, were fatal to their introduction and, by turns, using 
them to underpin a class action regime.
74 In Australia, lawyers may also charge a fi xed agreed sum and percentage uplift if the claim is 
successful in a manner similar to that in England and Wales. Canada, where class actions are 
well established, has a contingency fee system.
75 The legislation, and Law Society regulations, on this issue refer to “contentious business”, which 
includes any business done by a solicitor in any court, whether as a solicitor or as an advocate. 
See s.2(1) Legal Practitioners Ordinance, available at http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/legis/ord/159/
s2.html.
76 See the LRC’s July 2007 fi nal report on conditional fees for a detailed explanation of these torts. 
Available at http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/publications/rconditional.htm.
77 See chapter 6 of the LRC’s fi nal report on conditional fees.
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Equally fatal was the fact that representatives of the 180-plus insurance 
companies in the territory were “sceptical as to the likelihood that ATE 
insurance could be offered in Hong Kong on a long-term basis at rates 
which were commercially viable, without being prohibitively expensive 
for the consumer industry”. Whilst it is true that ATE cover has been the 
subject of controversy and contentious satellite litigation in England and 
Wales, its existence has been crucial to the development of litigation 
since the introduction of conditional fee arrangements. It is hoped that 
the implementation of Lord Justice Jackson’s litigation funding and costs 
reforms in April 2013 will “remove unnecessary costs and to restore balance 
to the system”.78 In the meantime, despite the LRC’s efforts, Hong Kong 
remains fi rmly stuck in the 1990s – or earlier – as far as litigation funding 
is concerned due to the reluctance of the legal profession to accept a 
share of the risk which litigants face when pursuing or defending diffi cult 
cases and the reluctance of the insurance industry to provide ATE cover. 
As a consequence, the LRC’s proposals for a comprehensive class action 
regime face little prospect of being realised.
The Future Class Action Regime
Let us assume that the Solicitor General’s cross-sector working group 
endorses the LRC’s fi nal report, which is far from certain, and suffi cient 
public money is forthcoming to support an expanded Consumer Legal 
Action Fund or CAF. What will Hong Kong have acquired? In short, 
it will have something akin to a government-funded pilot scheme for 
a discrete category of potential plaintiffs. Purchasers of, say, a defective 
refrigerator or improperly labeled food product will be able to group 
together, select a representative plaintiff, obtain funding from the CAF 
and seek redress from the manufacturers or suppliers of the said products. 
By contrast, those wishing to bring, say, a claim in respect of the poor air 
quality in the territory or similar environmental issues will have to rely 
on individual actions or representative proceedings under an unreformed 
RHC O.15 r.12 and, in the absence of public money or a conditional fee 
arrangement, they will bear the entirety of costs burden themselves.
This is an unfortunate consequence of the bureaucratic and procedural 
cul-de-sac into which the LRC found itself when it focused – intentionally 
78 See details of the reforms see the UK Ministry of Justice website, available at http://www.justice.
gov.uk/consultations/566. Also there is the MoJ’s timetable for implementation available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/civil-justice-reforms-full-package
.pdf. Lord Justice Jackson’s actual fi nal report is available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/
rdonlyres/8EB9F3F3-9C4A-4139-8A93-56F09672EB6A/0/jacksonfi nalreport140110.pdf.
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or otherwise – on class actions. Class actions are both politically 
controversial and raise procedural issues which are diffi cult to reconcile 
with Hong Kong’s current civil court system. In the absence of any 
willingness on the part of the legal profession or other interested parties 
to entertain conditional or contingency fees – or any other radical costs-
shifting measures – a comprehensive class action regime would require 
some form of public funding or the presence of wealthy and philanthropic 
representative plaintiffs to operate within the “costs follow the event” 
rules. By contrast, other forms of multi-party litigation, such as the English 
GLO, are not so hamstrung or, at least, not to the same extent.
GLOs are not without their faults and critics, not least the UK 
Civil Justice Council and Professor Mulheron, whose views apparently 
persuaded the LRC not to entertain them as a possible step forward for 
Hong Kong.79 That said, GLOs have been used extensively since their 
introduction over a decade ago. There are 76 GLOs listed on the UK 
Ministry of Justice’s group litigation register,80 including those for such 
cases as the “toxic sofa litigation” against several furniture suppliers and 
more recently a GLO involving almost two thousand plaintiffs who 
brought a personal injury claim against the baby buggy manufacturer 
Maclaren.81 A number of the respondents to the consultation paper, 
including Clifford Chance, expressed the view that something akin to 
GLOs would be an appropriate reform in Hong Kong.
Whilst it may be true that many common law jurisdictions already 
have a class action regime; that the EU began a consultation exercise in 
2011 entitled “Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress”;82 and that even the UK Government has decided to permit 
collective competition law claims on an “opt-out” basis,83 this is unlikely 
to impress many in Hong Kong that we should do the same. It is worth 
recalling that the CJR took over nine years to be implemented; that the 
“new” Arbitration Ordinance (Cap.609) which abolished the distinction 
between domestic and international arbitrations had a similarly lengthy 
79 See also SMC Gibbons, “Group Litigation, Class Actions and Lord Woolf ’s Three Objectives—A 
Critical Analysis” (2008) 27 Civil Justice Quarterly 208–243; and QC David Hart, “Some 
Imperfections in the Group Litigation System: More Power to the Judges?” (October 2009) 
available at http://www.1cor.com/1198/section.nc?startpointt1159i47=1200.
80 Available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/rcj-rolls-building/queens-bench/group-litigation
-orders
81 See Insley. J, “Maclaren agrees to compensate UK children injured by pushchair hinge” (6 May 
2010) The Guardian, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2010/may/06/maclaren-
compensate-children-injured-pushchair.
82 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0054_en.htm
83 Consultation paper available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/fi le/70185/13-501-private-actions-in-competition-law-a-consultation-on-
options-for-reform-government-response1.pdf.
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gestation; and that, whilst solicitor corporations were legislated for in 
1997, there are still none in existence. In Hong Kong “The wheels of 
justice grind slowly”. Given that fact, it may be worthwhile the Solicitor 
General’s working group giving some consideration to the introduction 
of GLOs, if only as an interim measure until a comprehensive class action 
regime, supported by appropriate private funding mechanisms, can be 
introduced. Perhaps, in addition, the working group could consider the 
possibility of the Hong Kong government contributing – in whole or part – 
to the payment of ATE insurance premiums. It is likely that such a step 
would be less costly, and therefore less contentious, than extending legal 
aid to class actions or creating a CAF. If nothing else, it may remove one 
obstacle to conditional fee agreements and hasten the introduction of a 
class action regime – if that is what Hong Kong truly wants.
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